Extended Rationality

A Hinge Epistemology

Bibliographic Data

ID10691324
AuthorsNatalie A Ashton (0000-0002-2885-9576, corresponding author)
Year2017
Volume67
Issue266
Pages169-171
Publication date2017-01-01
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqv122
OpenAlexW2521257057
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited3

In this interesting book, Annalisa Coliva develops an account of the structure of justification inspired by Wittgenstein's epistemology, and reveals its significance for many contemporary problems. This ‘extended rationality’ view has two key components. The first is moderatism about perceptual warrants, and the second is constitutivism about epistemic rationality. Moderatism is the view that, absent defeaters, the appropriate course of experience can justify a proposition about a particular domain of beliefs (for example those about material objects) only in conjunction with a relevant, general, unwarrantable assumption, such as ‘there is an external world’ (p. 34). This is introduced as a middle way between liberalism—a view defended by Jim Pryor, according to which, absent defeaters, the appropriate course of experience alone is sufficient (and necessary) for justification—and conservatism—a view defended by Crispin Wright, according to which, absent defeaters, the appropriate course of experience can justify only in conjunction with a relevant, general, warranted assumption.

Conjunction (astronomy) · Conservatism · Epistemology · Political science · Proposition · Rationality · Skepticism · Wright · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics

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