Persons

Most of the articles collected in the volume were presented at a workshop in Princeton in 2004. Apart from the first section of Alvin Plantinga's contribution, the papers are published here for the first time. The largest part of the book deals with questions in the philosophy of mind, particularly with questions related to the ontology of human persons. Minor sections of articles focus on ethical aspects of human persons in reference to their embodiment, or on questions concerning divine persons. Because the essays dealing with divine persons are outnumbered by those dealing with human persons, most of which treat divine persons only briefly, if at all, the title of the book might mislead those who expect equal treatment of human and divine persons. The major problem with the book is to be found in the trendy introduction written by Dean Zimmerman, where he distinguishes between analytic and Continental philosophy. Although he is aware that ‘neither label is very appropriate, and neither stream very unified’ (p. 4), his characterization of Continental philosophy and Continental philosophical theology is badly misinformed or merely stipulative. According to Zimmerman, ‘philosophers in the Continental tradition tend to be extremely sceptical of philosophical system‐building and metaphysical theorizing, activities that were once central to the task of philosophical theology ... [and] tend to believe that it is no longer possible to engage in grand philosophical speculation with a clear conscience, at least not once one has absorbed the morals to be drawn from some subset of Kant, Nietzsche, Freud, Marx, Heidegger, Derrida, etc.’ (p. 5). This is in two respects false. Not only is it false that Continental philosophers tend to think this, as Zimmerman should know by looking at such philosophers and theologians as Karl Barth, Karl Rahner, Dieter Henrich and Klaus Müller (and, of course, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and Schopenhauer) who engage in what can only be called ‘grand metaphysical speculation’, but it is also simply false that Kant, Nietzsche and Heidegger did not engage in philosophical system building. They did not do so in the same way as Bolzano, Frege and Russell did in order to elaborate a logical system, but this is no reason to deny them the status of system builders, as Zimmerman does. Another problem with his distinction between ‘Continental’ and ‘analytic’ philosophy is a certain analytic chauvinism (which is very crudely expressed: ‘analytic philosophy got a bum rap’, p. 2). Zimmerman appeals to the ‘Continental’ philosophers: ‘find out for yourselves whether analytic philosophy is really so arid as you have been told. See if it has anything convincing to say in response to the arguments ... used by Continental philosophers to undermine our more traditional approach to philosophy’ (p. 13, my italics). It is a merely chauvinistic assertion that the ‘analytic’ philosopher's approach to philosophy is in any relevant sense ‘more traditional’ than the putative ‘Continental’ approach. Both the ‘analytic’ and the ‘Continental’ approach to philosophy originated in the German‐ and Austrian‐speaking areas of Europe, and if there is a distinction at all, then it obtains only in so far as the same philosophical questions are answered in different ways: cf. the entry ‘Continental’ and ‘Analytic’ in T. Honderich (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford UP, 2005), pp. 172–4. However, and here I agree with Zimmerman (even if his choice of words would not have been mine), if you are not familiar with the way in which ‘analytic’ philosophers answer philosophical questions, ‘please don't simply toss the book aside, now that you’ve discovered the authors are a bunch of analytic philosophers! Give us a chance!’ (p. 2)

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