Adorno's Practical Philosophy
Living Less Wrongly
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10691464 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Owen Hulatt (0000-0002-5868-6477, University of York, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2014 |
| Volume | 64 |
| Issue | 256 |
| Pages | 523-525 |
| Publication date | 2014-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqu017 |
| OpenAlex | W1976093392 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
Beginning with Habermas’ criticism in Philosophical Profiles, a traditional complaint levelled against Theodor Adorno's philosophy has been its apparent incapability to normatively support its assertions. Adorno consistently claimed to be an anti-foundationalist philosopher, eschewing all foundational premises and norms. As Habermas noted, however, and this has been something of a sticking point ever since, Adorno consistently makes use of moral language in his analysis and condemnation of social pathologies and phenomena (the terms ‘evil’ and ‘bad’ are frequently used, among others). Given these apparently robust evaluative and normative claims, a number of questions follow. By virtue of what normative standard does Adorno make these evaluative descriptions? How could Adorno make such a normative standard compatible with his anti-foundationalism? Alternatively, if, as Adorno claims, there are no foundational normative standards in play, how is Adorno entitled to make these negative evaluations? Responses to this issue have been mixed, and there is no settled consensus in the literature on to what extent, or if at all, Adorno should be seen as a moralist, or advancing moral claims. In this insightful and carefully developed book, Freyenhagen opts to confront the Habermasian complaint head-on. Freyenhagen argues that not only is Adorno's philosophy normatively loaded and normatively coherent, it should be seen as substantially and centrally moral. However, it is claimed that Adorno's moral claims are invariably negative—concerning descriptions of moral harms and injuries. In elaborating his reading of Adorno, Freyenhagen engages in a careful and attentive dismantling of the interpretive claims, and normative assumptions, which generated the putative problems articulated by critics like Habermas. In an argument of interest not only to Adorno scholars, Freyenhagen argues that Adorno's position is ‘moral negativism’, which is capable of sustaining ethical and normative criticism without recourse to a positive, constructive moral standard. This reconstructive, interpretive approach is also attended by constructive work which finds in and extrapolates from Adorno's writings a ‘negative Aristotelianism’.
Complaint · Criticism · Epistemology · Foundationalism · Normative · Sociology · Virtue · Critical Theory and Philosophy · Hannah Arendt's Political Philosophy · Law · Philosophy · Psychoanalysis, Philosophy, and Politics
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,36 |
| Citation span | 2015 - 2025 (11) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |