Internal Reasons
Reply to Brady, Van Roojen and Gert
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10691497 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Robert W Johnson (0000-0002-8376-7412, University of Missouri, corresponding author), Robert N Johnson |
| Year | 2003 |
| Volume | 53 |
| Issue | 213 |
| Pages | 573-580 |
| Publication date | 2003-10-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9213.00333 |
| OpenAlex | W2056571772 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
In an earlier paper I identified two desiderata of a theory of practical reasons which favour internalism, and then argued that forms of this doctrine which are currently on offer lose either one or the other in trying to avoid the conditional fallacy. Michael Brady, Mark van Roojen and Josh Gert have separately attempted to respond to my argument. I set out reasons why all fail
Argument (complex analysis) · Doctrine · Epistemology · Fallacy · Internalism and externalism · Set (abstract data type) · Theology · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy
| Citations per year | 0.11 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2017 - 2017 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |