On Block's delineation of the border between seeing and thinking
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10691847 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Christopher S Hill (0000-0003-1036-1195, Brown University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 74 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 1358-1366 |
| Publication date | 2024-09-25 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqae030 |
| OpenAlex | W4393902488 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 11 |
This note is concerned with Ned Block's claim that cognition differs from perception in being paradigmatically conceptual, propositional, and non-iconic. As against Block, it maintains that large stretches of cognition constitutively involve, or depend on, iconic representations
Block (permutation group theory) · Geography · Geometry · Categorization, perception, and language · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Mathematics · Multisensory perception and integration
| Highly cited | No |
|---|