Give People a Break

Slips and Moral Responsibility

Bibliographic Data

ID10691859
AuthorsFernando Rudy-Hiller (0000-0002-7977-1216, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, corresponding author)
Year2019
Volume69
Issue277
Pages721-740
Publication date2019-10-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqz020
OpenAlexW2944024918
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited23

I examine the question of whether people are sometimes morally blameworthy for what I call ‘slips’: wrongful actions or omissions that a good-willed (or at least no ill-willed) agent inadvertently performs due to a non-negligent failure to be aware of relevant considerations. I focus in particular on the capacitarian answer to this question, according to which possession of the requisite capacities to be aware of relevant considerations and respond appropriately explains blameworthiness for slips. I argue, however, that capacitarianism fails to show that agents have responsibility level control over their slips and, consequently, fails to show that it is reasonable to expect agents to avoid this kind of wrongdoing. I conclude that people are typically not blameworthy for their slips, but only regarding the backward-looking, desert-entailing type of blame that has been at issue in this debate. I suggest that ordinary intuitions about blameworthiness for slips can be accommodated by appealing to other types of responsibility and blame

Blame · Compatibilism · Epistemology · Focus (optics) · Law and economics · Moral responsibility · Possession (linguistics) · Sociology · Wrongdoing · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology · War, Ethics, and Justification

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