How anger helps us possess reasons for action

Bibliographic Data

ID10691918
AuthorsSteven Gubka (0000-0001-6314-5926, Rice University, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume76
Issue3
Pages982-1002
Publication date2024-09-02
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqae105
OpenAlexW4402135091
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited28

I argue that anger helps us possess reasons to intervene against others. This is because fitting anger disposes us to intervene against others in light of reasons to do so. I propose that anger is a presentation of reasons that seems to rationalize such interventions, in much the same way that perceptual experience is a presentation of reasons that seems to rationalize our judgements about our environment. In this way, anger can help us possess reasons that make specific actions rational to perform. Moreover, the significance of anger to practical rationality informs how we should regulate anger, especially the anger of others. Along these lines, I argue that it is wrong to prevent anger to the extent that this prevents someone's possession of reasons to intervene, and it is right to provoke anger to the extent that this enables someone's possession of reasons to intervene

Action (physics) · Anger · Physics · Computer Science · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology

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