Actions, Motives and Causes
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10692205 |
|---|---|
| Authors | James Lenman (0000-0003-3823-6089, University of Sheffield, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2008 |
| Volume | 58 |
| Issue | 231 |
| Pages | 353-362 |
| Publication date | 2008-04-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.514.x |
| OpenAlex | W2062330345 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 2 |
In this book Alfred Mele seeks to elaborate and defend a neo‐Davidsonian understanding of human agency which is fundamentally causalist: intentional actions are, he thinks, caused and caused in such a way that a causal explanation of them is available in terms of the desires and intentions of the agent. Chapter 2 (following a stage‐setting opening chapter) develops Davidson's most telling argument in favour of a causal interpretation of rationalizing explanations of action. Sometimes, more than one such rationalizing explanation is available and only one is right. Perhaps I believe that by making a certain remark I shall both irk the disagreeable Trevor and amuse the aimiable Sandra and I am the proud owner of desires to do both these things but only one may be my actual motive on this occasion. Both desires rationalize what I do but only one is in fact my reason for doing it. Davidson's challenge to noncausalists is to find some credible alternative to saying that this is so in virtue of the distinctive causal relevance of that desire.1
Action (physics) · Agency (philosophy) · Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Interpretation (philosophy) · Linguistics · Political science · Relevance (law) · Sociology · Virtue · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Highly cited | No |
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