Veridicalism and Scepticism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10692289 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Yuval Avnur (Scripps College, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 74 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 393-407 |
| Publication date | 2024-03-29 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqad076 |
| OpenAlex | W4386189652 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 13 |
According to veridicalism, your beliefs about the existence of ordinary objects are typically true, and can constitute knowledge, even if you are in some global sceptical scenario. Even if you are a victim of Descartes’ demon, you can still know that there are tables, for example. Accordingly, even if you don’t know whether you are in some such scenario, you still know that there are tables. This refutes the standard sceptical argument. But does it solve the sceptical problem posed by that argument? I argue that it does not, because we do not know substantively more about the external world according to veridicalism than we do according to the sceptical argument. Rather, veridicalism merely reformulates what little knowledge we have. I then draw some general conclusions about the nature of the sceptical problem, the formulation of the standard argument, and the significance of this for some other, non-veridicalist strategies
Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Skepticism · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |