Dualism-Materialism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10692337 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Robert Herbert (University of Oregon, corresponding author), R T Herbert |
| Year | 1998 |
| Volume | 48 |
| Issue | 191 |
| Pages | 145-158 |
| Publication date | 1998-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9213.00088 |
| OpenAlex | W4245030698 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 3 |
I argue that in rejecting Cartesian ‘mind’ and retaining Cartesian ‘body’, materialism/physicalism falls to the allure of three charming but deadly ‘eliminative’ identities: perceivable properties become particles in motion; perception, by being ‘sensationized’, turns into neuronal activity; and a perceiver becomes a brain in a body. In rebuttal I argue that ‘particles in motion’ does not nullify but instead preserves the perceivable properties it seeks to explain; ‘neuronal activity’ is not a reduction of, but is doubtlessly necessary to, perception; and a perceiver is not a brain in a body, since ‘body’ in the Cartesian/materialist context is a conceptual confusion that reifies a human being's physical side
Dualism · Epistemology · Materialism · History and Theory of Mathematics · Philosophy
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |