Working without a Net
A Study of Egocentric Epistemology
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10693375 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Richard Fumerton (0000-0003-2640-0873) |
| Year | 1995 |
| Volume | 104 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 141 |
| Publication date | 1995-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | REVIEW |
| Review of | Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology, Richard Foley, 1992 |
| Venue | The Philosophical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2186024 |
| OpenAlex | W2057410764 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
In this book Foley offers a major new theory of rationality. His aim is to escape the 'doldrums of Descartes' by lowering the standard for what is rational from his impossibly demanding level of certainty. Foley takes a belief's being rational as a matter of its seeming from some perspective to be objectively likely to be true. This makes for an attractive mix of subjective and objective components in his concept of rationality. The subjective component makes rationality attainable; the objective component preserves the discipline of external constraint
Analytic philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · Net (polyhedron) · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Mathematics · Philosophy · Psychology
Bayesianism II
Rationality Disputes - Psychology and Epistemology
A Confiança Epistêmica No Testemunho
Metaphors as research tools in economics
Reason and Rationality
Augustinian Anthropology
Justificação, coerência e circularidade
An accuracy characterisation of approximate coherence
Turning the trolley with reflective equilibrium
Scepticism about the argument from divine hiddenness
What Moore's Paradox Is About
Risky belief
Rational social and political polarization
Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions
On the Arbitrariness Objection to the Threshold View
Normative Reasons
Believing Conjunctions
Another Argument Against Uniqueness
Four Approaches to Supposition
Testimonial Reliance
Legal Standards of Proof
The Precautionary Principle and Expert Disagreement
Credence
Real and ideal rationality
Are epistemic reasons normative
Who’s afraid of cognitive diversity
Doxastic gradualism without credences
Why Credences Are Not Beliefs
Closing the Case on Self-Fulfilling Beliefs
Belief, Credence and Statistical Evidence
Believing the best
All things considered duties to believe
Rigged lotteries
Ideal rationality and logical omniscience
Deductive Cogency, understanding, and acceptance
The nature of doubt and a new puzzle about belief, doubt, and confidence
On the epistemic rationality and significance of self-fulfilling beliefs
Everybody else is thinking it, so why can’t we
Will I get a job? Contextualism, belief, and faith
A pluralistic account of epistemic rationality
Assertion, belief, and context
Coherence as an ideal of rationality
Peer Disagreement, Evidence, and Well-Groundedness
The Ethics of Belief
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |