Conditional Probabilities and Compounds of Conditionals
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10693527 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Vann Mcgee (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1989 |
| Volume | 98 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 485 |
| Publication date | 1989-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2185116 |
| OpenAlex | W2017240052 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 27 |
| References cited | 3 |
Tjrnest Adams (1965, 1975) has advanced a probabilistic acL count of conditionals, according to which the probability of a simple English indicative conditional is the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent. The theory describes what English speakers assert and accept with unfailing accuracy, yet the theory has won only limited acceptance. A principal reason for this has been that the theory is so limited in its scope. While the theory does a marvelous job of accounting for how we use simple conditionals, it tells us nothing about compound conditionals or about Boolean combinations of conditionals. In view of the Lewis Triviality Theorem (which we shall discuss below), this limitation has been thought to be insuperable, so that Adams's theory has appeared to be a dead end, highly accurate in a narrowly specialized domain, but isolated from the rest of logical theory and unable to overcome that isolation. Adams's theory has also seemed to be isolated from probability theory, since it tells us nothing about the of Boolean compounds of conditionals, and the laws governing the of Boolean compounds lie at the very center of classical probability theory. Since the laws of probability cannot be meaningfully applied to the numerical values Adams assigns to conditionals, there has seemed to be little point in referring to these numerical values as probabilities. The numerical values accurately measure the assertability and acceptability of conditionals, but they are, as Lewis (1976, p. 135) puts it, probabilities only in name. In the present paper, I shall attempt to meet these difficulties
Analytic philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · Advanced Algebra and Logic · Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Mathematics · Philosophy
Topics of Thought
Bruno de Finetti and the Logic of Conditional Events
If-Clauses and Probability Operators
A graph model for probabilities of nested conditionals
Probabilities of Conditionals via Labeled Markov Graphs
Conditionals
Indicative conditionals
Probabilities of conditionals
Deep and shallow conditionals – and three alleged counterexamples
Certain and Uncertain Inference with Indicative Conditionals
Proposition-valued random variables as information
On the Probabilities of Conditionals
The Problem of Noncounterfactual Conditionals
A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals
Dutch‐booking indicative conditionals
Counterfactual Triviality
Chance, ability, and control
Credences for strict conditionals
The new Tweety puzzle
Moore-paradoxical belief, conscious belief and the epistemic Ramsey test
A metaphysical foundation for mathematical philosophy
Attitudes, deliberation and decisions
A Representation Theorem for a Decision Theory With Conditionals
An inductive construction of a model for probabilities of complex conditionals
Dutch Book against Lewis
Bayesian Confirmation of Theories That Incorporate Idealizations
Multidimensional Possible-World Semantics for Conditionals
| Unique citing works | 27 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,84 |
| Citation span | 1994 - 2026 (33) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 27 |