The Norms of Reason
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10693561 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Richard W Miller (0000-0002-4409-1173, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1995 |
| Volume | 104 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 205 |
| Publication date | 1995-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2185978 |
| OpenAlex | W2332874317 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
A belief is rational just in case it is governed by the norms underlying cooperation in pursuit of truth. A person knows something just in case her belief in it results from successful conformity to these norms. I will develop and defend this cooperative view of rational belief and knowledge, and employ it to advance two central projects of epistemology: finding a principled response to wholesale skepticism that is not a license for dogmatic belief, and constructing an account of knowledge that is both sensitive to the ways in which knowledge depends on objective relations to external facts and sufficiently stringent in its demands for justification
Analytic philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · General interest · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,04 |
| Citation span | 1999 - 1999 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |