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Is Introspective Knowledge Incorrigible

Bibliographic Data

ID10693782
AuthorsD M Armstrong (0009-0009-3813-6900, corresponding author)
Year1963
Volume72
Issue4
Pages417
Publication date1963-10-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
PublisherJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2183028
OpenAlexW2328074155
LanguageEN
Citations received22

BY SENSE PERCEPTION we can become aware of the current state of our physical environment, including our own body. It is very natural to say that, in similar fashion, we can become aware of the current events in our own minds. Instead of turning outward to physical events, the mind turns inward on itself and perceives a procession of mental events. Locke spoke of the faculty of reflection, Kant spoke of inner sense, modern philosophy often speaks of introspection. believe this traditional view to be essentially correct. But, it is often held, introspection differs from sense perception in one very important respect. Introspective reports of current mental events are alleged to be logically or logically indubitable. If make the sincere statement I seem to be seeing something green then, it is alleged, it is logically impossible for me to be mistaken in my statement. may be lying, of course, but then will know that my statement is untrue. For, it is argued, if mistake were a possibility then it would make sense to say I think seem to be seeing something green now, but perhaps am wrong. But this is nonsense, it is said, and so introspection is logically or logically indubitable. (In the rest of this paper shall simply say incorrigible or indubitable, and shall use the two words interchangeably.) Incorrigibility, or indubitability, must be distinguished from logical necessity. Whether or not the sincere statement I seem to be seeing something green now is incorrigible, it is certainly not logically necessary. This is most easily seen if we remember that a logically necessary truth is true in all possible worlds. Now we can certainly describe worlds where do not seem to be seeing something green now. Contrariwise, it may be noted, a logically necessary statement need not be incorrigible. It is not true that we assent to any logically necessary statement as soon as we understand it. We may mistakenly think it is false. It took a long

Epistemology · Introspection · Cognitive Science and Education Research · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology

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Unique citing works22
Citations per year0,76
Citation span1997 - 2026 (30)
Citation velocitycurrent
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 22

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