Acting for Reasons
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10693792 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Robert Audi (0000-0001-9192-0256, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1986 |
| Volume | 95 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 511 |
| Publication date | 1986-10-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2185049 |
| OpenAlex | W2312904449 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 25 |
I f we do not know for what reasons a person acts, we do not fully understand that person. If we do not know any reason for which an agent does something, we cannot adequately assess whether, in doing it, that agent is acting rationally. And if Kant is right, unless we know the reason(s) for which an action is performed, we do not know its moral worth. But what is it to act for a reason? Clearly, acting for a reason is closely related to acting intentionally, to acting rationally, and to acting on the basis of practical reasoning. An action for a reason apparently must be intentional; an action based on practical reasoning must be performed for a reason; and at least the paradigms of rational action must be intentional. Whether there are some equivalences among these notions will be discussed below. Let us begin by laying out some guiding assumptions
Analytic philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · General interest · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy
An Internalist Conception of Rational Action
Faith, Belief, and Rationality
Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle about Rationality
Justification and the Truth-Connection
Libertarian Accounts of Free Will
Motivation and Practical Reasons
The Limits of Neutrality
Aesthetic Insight and Mental Agency
Motor Imagery and Action Execution
Moral Worth and Consciousness
The Disappearing Agent and the Phenomenology of Agency
Why are Actions but not Emotions Done Intentionally, if both are Reason-Responsive Embodied Processes
Buyer Beware
Rationality, preference satisfaction and anomalous intentions
Are reasons normatively basic
Oppressive Double Binds
It's time we put agency into Behavioural Public Policy
O que é agência epistêmica, afinal
Determinism, deliberation, and responsibility
An attempt at a general solution to the problem of deviant causal chains
The distinction between desires and intentions
Nonconceptual apprehension and the reason-giving character of perception
Guidance control and the anti-akrasia chip
Anti-intellectualism, instructive representations, and the intentional action argument
Disagreement-based uncertainty for decision making
| Citations per year | 0.69 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1990 - 2025 (36) |
| Highly cited | No |