Compatibilism About Coincidence

It seems to be a platitude of common sense that distinct ordinary objects cannot coincide, that they cannot fit into the same place or be composed of the same parts at the same time. The paradoxes of coincidence are instances of a breakdown of this platitude in light of counterexamples that are licensed by innocuous assumptions about particular kinds of ordinary object. Since both the anticoincidence principle and the assumptions driving the counterexamples flow from the folk conception of ordinary objects, the paradoxes threaten this conception with inconsistency. Typical approaches to the paradoxes reject the anticoincidence principle or some portion of the assumptions driving the counterexamples, thereby partially revising our common conception of the world around us. This essay offers a compatibilist solution to the paradoxes that sustains the folk conception of ordinary objects in its entirety. According to this solution, the various cases of distinct coincidents do not clash with the anticoincidence principle since the cases and the principle manifest different yet compatible perspectives on the world

Coincidence · Compatibilism · Counterexample · Discrete mathematics · Epistemology · Free will · Incompatibilism · Linguistics · Object (grammar) · Physics · Property (philosophy) · Theoretical physics · Free Will and Agency · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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