Modal Realism

The Poisoned Pawn

Bibliographic Data

ID10694307
AuthorsFabrizio Mondadori, Adam Morton (0000-0002-9073-7529)
Year1976
Volume85
Issue1
Pages3
Publication date1976-01-01
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
PublisherJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2184252
OpenAlexW2087566143
LanguageEN
Citations received13

Geller came closer to actual qualification than ever did. Very few could have expected that the so-far undefeated Portisch would suffer his first and only defeat just in the last round against Polugaev- sky, thus allowing the uncertainty of further competition in which either he, Polugaevsky or Geller would be eliminated from the candi- dates. Later, in Portoroz, if Geller had only whispered to Portisch the word draw! few seconds before his flag fell while pawn up and unaware of the approaching time control, Geller and not Polugaevsky would have been among the candidates (S. Gligoric, Unlucky Ones, Chess Life and Review, 29 (1974), 17). LJUBOJEVIC might have won the Petropolis Interzonal, for the quality of his play in previous tournaments, his inventiveness, and his ability systematically to surprise his opponents were sure signs of an extraordinarily talented chess player. Up to the time at which he was leading the he had played very strongly, he had scored brilliant victories, and all he needed to go on and win was simply to play less inventively and more quietly. The conclusion of the argument, that might have won the tournament, is modal; it concerns what might have happened. But the argument concerns the world as it actually is, its chess players, tournaments, and games. We think that all reasoning about modality is about actual objects, facts, and processes. Ljubojevic might have won the Petropolis Interzonal gives just as definite and objective report about actual individuals and situations as Meck- ing won the Petropolis Interzonal does. We think that this is true of most modal assertions: a might n, a would n, a could n, a would b if , a might b if ..., the dispositional -ble (-ible

Epistemology · Modal · Realism · Artificial Intelligence in Games · Computability, Logic, AI Algorithms · Materials Science · Philosophy

Tools

Open DOISci-HubOpen Access