Counterfactuals and Probability
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10694321 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jill Khoo (0000-0001-8696-0771, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, corresponding author), Justin Khoo (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 129 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 489-495 |
| Publication date | 2020-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470 |
| Publisher | Duke University Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1215/00318108-8311486 |
| OpenAlex | W3088230941 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 2 |
Book Review| July 01 2020 Counterfactuals and Probability Schulz, Moritz, Counterfactuals and Probability. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. x + 236 pp. Justin Khoo Justin Khoo Massachusetts Institute of Technology Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 489–495. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-8311486 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter Email Permissions Search Site Citation Justin Khoo; Counterfactuals and Probability. The Philosophical Review 1 July 2020; 129 (3): 489–495. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-8311486 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search nav search search input Search input auto suggest search filter Books & JournalsAll JournalsThe Philosophical Review Search Advanced Search Much of the work on counterfactuals done in linguistics and philosophy in the past forty years has focused on their truth conditions and entailment patterns, in sharp contrast with the literature on indicative conditionals, which has had to reckon with a cottage industry of probabilistic triviality results (starting with Lewis 1976). This is an unfortunate oversight, since intuitions about the probabilities of counterfactuals provide a window into their meaning and the role they play in thought and talk. Moritz Schulz’s book aims to address this gap.In my review, I discuss the central puzzle animating Schulz’s discussion and his proposed solution. The puzzle stems from a plausible empirical generalization about the probabilities of counterfactuals (Schulz calls this Skyrms’s Constraint; see 78–88).Evaluation Constraint P(A>C)=∑xP(Chw(C|fw(... © 2020 by Cornell University2020 You do not currently have access to this content
Counterfactual conditional · Counterfactual thinking · Epistemology · Icon · Mathematical economics · Programming language · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Probability and Statistical Research
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |