A Note on Act Utilitarianism

IN HIS essay An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics (Melbourne, i96i) J. J. C. Smart defends a version of act utilitarianism. This version is defined by the following two formulations which, I take it, are intended as rough formulations of the same principle: (i) The rightness or wrongness of an action is to be judged by the consequences, good and bad, of the action itself (p. 4). (2) The only reason for performing an action A rather than an alternative action is that doingA will makemankind (or, perhaps, all sentient beings) happier than will doing B (p. 20). For Smart (i) and (2) are normative principles rather than analyses of the meanings of ethical terms. He is, moreover, assuming a noncognitive metaethics. It follows that (i) and (2) do not express propositions which can be true or false, but are expressions of a preference or attitude. My ultimate moral principle ... expresses the sentiment . . . of benevolence (p. 2i). He admits that ... act utilitarianism were put forward as a descriptive systematization of how the ordinary man, or even we ourselves in our unreflective and uncritical moments, actually think about ethics, then of course is easy to refute and I have no wish to defend it (p. 41). Smart would seem to be proposing a rule of evaluation rather than either analyzing the rules we in fact use or expressing a principle which is either true or false. Although he accepts (i) and (2) and wants others to accept them, he evidently feels that they are the sorts of things about which one can raise objections, for he devotes most of his essay to replying to objections. One way of objecting to a principle that someone lays down is to point out that some of its logical consequences are false. But since neither (i) nor (2) expresses propositions or statements, is not clear how they can have logical consequences or entailments. For to say that one thing x entails another thingy implies that is logically impossible for the conjunction of x with the negation ofy to be true. But (i) and (2) are not the sorts of things of which makes sense to say that their conjunction with something else is either true or false. Given that (i) and (2) are not put forward as propositions or as analyses of moral concepts, is not clear how they can be the subjects of rational discussion. On occasion Smart does assert, however, that act utilitarianism is logically compatible with some views and incompatible with others. On these occasions he treats (i) and (2) as if they expressed

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