Geometry and Necessary Truth
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10694619 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Raymond D Bradley (0000-0002-1973-2661), Raymond Bradley (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1964 |
| Volume | 73 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 59 |
| Publication date | 1964-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2183202 |
| OpenAlex | W2324980697 |
| Language | EN |
M Y AIM in this paper is to reinstate a philosophical thesis which once held the field but seems now to stand in need of a champion: I mean the thesis that the sentences of pure geometry in general, and those of pure Euclidean geometry in particular, may be used to express necessarily true propositions. In order to do so I shall try to dispose in turn of the following three objections, each of which has won the allegiance of influential philosophers and mathematicians
Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · General interest · Geometry · History and Theory of Mathematics · Mathematics · Mathematics and Applications · Philosophy
| Highly cited | No |
|---|