Rational Probabilistic Incoherence

Bibliographic Data

ID10694858
AuthorsMichael Caie (Syracuse University, corresponding author)
Year2013
Volume122
Issue4
Pages527-575
Publication date2013-10-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
PublisherDuke University Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1215/00318108-2315288
OpenAlexW2098595607
LanguageEN
Citations received21
References cited18

Probabilism is the view that a rational agent's credences should always be probabilistically coherent. It has been argued that Probabilism follows, given the assumption that an epistemically rational agent ought to try to have credences that represent the world as accurately as possible. The key claim in this argument is that the goal of representing the world as accurately as possible is best served by having credences that are probabilistically coherent. This essay shows that this claim is false. In certain cases, the goal of having accurate credences is best served by being probabilistically incoherent. Assuming that an epistemically rational agent ought to try to have credences that are as accurate as possible, it follows that in certain cases a rational agent ought to have probabilistically incoherent credences

Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Key (lock) · Mathematical economics · Probabilistic logic · Rational agent · Artificial Intelligence · Chemistry · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science