Moral Conflict and Its Structure
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10695089 |
|---|---|
| Authors | David O Brink (0009-0005-9216-6351, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1994 |
| Volume | 103 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 215 |
| Publication date | 1994-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2185737 |
| OpenAlex | W1987138689 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 32 |
L'A. rejette l'evaluation statistique des consequences ethiques des dilemmes moraux fondee sur leur frequence et se pose la question primordiale de la structure de ces conflits, qui introduit une distinction fondamentale entre les obligations de prima facie et les obligations selon toutes choses considerees, les premieres constituant un veritable dilemme, soluble ou insoluble, mais non un paradoxe, les secondes ne constituant jamais de conflit en vertu de leur force morale exclusive
Analytic philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · General interest · Political science · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Philosophy
Prima facie
Putting oughts together
Dilemmas and Moral Realism
A Paraconsistent Solution to the Problem of Moral Dilemmas
I Ought, Therefore I Can
The Problem of the Second Best
Fitting-Attitude Analysis and the Logical Consequence Argument
When Adolescents and Emerging Adults Think Reasonable People Can Disagree about Morality and Politics
Norms for pure desire
Promoting Preschoolers’ Moral Reasoning Through Board Games and Peer Discussions
Are ‘Dirty Hands’ Possible
Moral judgments in native, regional, and foreign languages
The Content and Logic of Imperatives
MNEs’ Ambidexterity Strategies and Moral Conflicts
Unattainable duties
The Type-B Moral Error Theory
Moral rights without balancing
Logical norms as defeasible obligations
Interlocking content and attitude
Harm, relevant alternatives and norms
Law, ‘Ought’, and ‘Can’
Can reasonable people disagree about right and wrong? The determinants and implications of perceiving moral reasonableness
Impartiality and Associative Duties
Collective Reasons and Agent-Relativity
Emoções e sentimentos
Do our actions make any difference in wrong life
The Golem and The Leviathan
Moral Principles Are Not Moral Laws
Revisiting Arjuna’s Dilemma through Deontic Lens
Ought” Implies “Can” but Does Not Imply “Must”
On Essentially Conflicting Desires
Rationality is Not Coherence
| Unique citing works | 32 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,19 |
| Citation span | 1999 - 2026 (28) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 28 |