Quantification and Leibniz's Law
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10695460 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Mark Richard (0000-0002-8630-9097, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1987 |
| Volume | 96 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 555 |
| Publication date | 1987-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2185391 |
| OpenAlex | W2323497399 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
It is held by most logicians and philosophers of language that (L) is a principle fundamental to the intent of objectual quantification. It is widely believed, furthermore, that quantificational devices of English involving 'all', 'every' and analogous universal quantifiers, as well as English devices of existential quantification, are objectual quantifiers. And thus, it is widely believed that (L), or at least a somewhat more carefully formulated analogue, in which talk of variables is replaced or supplemented by talk of pronomial reference, is true of English. In this paper, I argue that (L) is not in any way fundamental to objectual quantification. All of the quantifiers of a language may be objectual, and yet sentences of the language which are instances of (L) may be false. I argue further that there are reasons for thinking that English is a language whose quantifiers are objectual, but for which (L) fails.' I will begin by presenting a putative counterexample to (L) in English. Suppose that John says to you
Analytic philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · General interest · Political science · Historical Linguistics and Language Studies · Law · Linguistic research and analysis · Philosophy · Syntax, Semantics, Linguistic Variation
| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,16 |
| Citation span | 1994 - 2019 (26) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |