Korsgaard's Arguments for the Value of Humanity
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10695747 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Michael Bukoski (0000-0002-8199-8129, Florida State University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 127 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 197-224 |
| Publication date | 2018-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470 |
| Publisher | Duke University Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1215/00318108-4326604 |
| OpenAlex | W2793560560 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 24 |
In The Sources of Normativity and elsewhere, Korsgaard defends a Kantian ethical theory by arguing that valuing anything commits one to valuing humanity as the source of all value. I reconstruct Korsgaard's influential argument to show how she can resist many of the objections that critics have raised. I also show how the argument fails because, at a crucial point, it begs the question in favor of the value of humanity. It thus fails for internal reasons that do not depend on rejecting Korsgaard's metaethical constructivism or her conception of rational agency
Agency (philosophy) · Argument (complex analysis) · Biology · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Humanity · Theology · Value (mathematics) · Ethics in medical practice · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person
Korsgaard, Wittgenstein, and the Mafioso
Duty and Desolation
Skepticism about practical reason
A Theory of Justice
The Sources of Normativity
The Roots of Reasons
Creating the Kingdom of Ends
Objective and Unconditioned Value
Korsgaard's Private‐Reasons Argument
Practical Identities and Autonomy
The Practical Turn in Ethical Theory
Korsgaard's Kantian Arguments for the Value of Humanity
Self-Constitution
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2025 (3) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |