Aristotle on the Identity of Substance and Essence

Bibliographic Data

ID10696416
AuthorsEdwin Hartman (corresponding author)
Year1976
Volume85
Issue4
Pages545
Publication date1976-10-01
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
PublisherJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2184278
OpenAlexW2322481339
LanguageEN
Citations received4

IT is Aristotle's view that the individual form or essence is substance primarily and that it is identical with the individual substance of which it is the form or essence. Matter is not substance, nor is any universal, nor is any combination of some form and some particular matter. Identifying a substance with its essence helps Aristotle to solve a difficulty about the unity of the individual substance: over a period of time an ordinary substance is likely to change in some ways. I shall argue that Aristotle recognizes this threat to the unity of the individual substance and that his doctrine of the identity of substance and essence provides a way of turning it aside. The intended result is to establish an anti-Heraclitean position: one can, after all, step into the same river twice. This view is not independent of certain positions on a variety of neighboring problems. It comes out of a general conception of what Aristotle is about, and what problems he thinks it important to solve. That is the topic of yet another essay, at least; but a few brief and necessarily somewhat dogmatic remarks on the historical background of Aristotle's mature views about the definition of substance and its relation to essence will make the exposition of those views clearer and more plausible

Aesthetics · Analytic philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · General interest · Identity (music) · Psychoanalysis · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Philosophy · Psychology

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