Visual Experience and Motor Action
Are the Bonds Too Tight
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 10696735 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Andrew Clark (0000-0002-2983-4469), Andy Clark (0000-0002-1233-8629, University of Edinburgh, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2001 |
| Volume | 110 |
| Fascículo | 4 |
| Páginas | 495-519 |
| Data de publicação | 2001-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Não |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | The Philosophical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470 |
| Editora | Duke University Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1215/00318108-110-4-495 |
| OpenAlex | W2129358906 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 48 |
| Referências citadas | 28 |
How should we characterize the functional role of conscious visual experience? In particular, how do the conscious contents of visual experience guide, bear upon, or otherwise inform our ongoing motor activities? According to an intuitive and (I shall argue) philosophically influential conception, the links are often quite direct. The contents of conscious visual experience, according to this conception, are typically active in the control and guidance of our fine-tuned, real-time engagements with the surrounding three-dimensional world. But this idea (which I shall call the Assumption of Experience-Based Control) is hostage to empirical fortune. It is a hostage, moreover, whose safety is in serious doubt. Thus Milner and Goodale (1995) argue for a deep and abiding dissociation between the contents of conscious seeing, on the one hand, and the resources used for the online guidance of visuomotor action, on the other. This “dual visual systems” hypothesis, which finds many echoes in various other bodies of cognitive scientific research, poses a prima facie challenge to the Assumption of Experience-Based Control. More importantly, it provides (I shall argue) fuel for an alternative and philosophically suggestive account of the functional role of conscious visual experience
Action (physics) · Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Control (management) · Dual (grammatical number) · Epistemology · Prima facie · Action Observation and Synchronization · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Motor Control and Adaptation · Philosophy · Psychology · Visual perception and processing mechanisms
Technology and the Not-so-Stable Body
Self-regulation and the hypothesis of experience-based selection
An Introduction to the Philosophy of Psychology
Pragmatic Mental Imagery
Vicarious Perception
Pragmatic Representations
Perception
Action
Two visual systems re-viewed
On the Significance of Bodily Awareness for Bodily Action
Between Perception and Action
Expecting some action
Visual experience in the predictive brain is univocal, but indeterminate
On the content of Peripersonal visual experience
Conscious vision guides motor action—rarely
Phylogenetic Distribution and Trajectories of Visual Consciousness
Mixed‐resource modeling meets the philosophy of mind
Illusory Illusions
Why the Pictorial Needs the Motoric
Unconscious perception and central coordinating agency
Action, Presence, and the Specious Present
The exceptionality of enactivism within 4E cognition
A distinction concerning vision-for-action and affordance perception
The two-visual-systems hypothesis and the perspectival features of visual experience
Pressing the Flesh
Egocentric Spatial Representation in Action and Perception
Percepción y pensamiento espacial. La veta reduccionista del enfoque enactivo
Anti-intellectualist motor knowledge
The where of bodily awareness
Between vision and action
Burge on perception and sensation
Peripersonal perception in action
Nonconceptual apprehension and the reason-giving character of perception
Philosophy and cognitive science on spatial and temporal experience
Visual phenomenology versus visuomotor imagery
The two visual systems hypothesis and contrastive underdetermination
Knowing what we can do
Are visuomotor representations cognitively penetrable? Biasing action-guiding vision
A psychofunctionalist argument against nonconceptualism
Reexamining the Psychophysical Evidence for the Two Visual Streams
Conceptual Art
Perception through a perspective-taking lens
What Reaching Teaches
Consciousness and Action
Visual Streams as Core Mechanisms
Nonconceptual Content
Aesthetics and Cognitive Science
Cognitive Penetrability of Perception
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories
The Mind's Past
The Paradox of Self-Consciousness
Size-contrast illusions deceive the eye but not the hand
A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness
Distributed Hierarchical Processing in the Primate Cerebral Cortex
Change blindness
The Contents of Experience
The Inaugural Address
A Study of Concepts
Nonconceptual Content Defended
Molyneux's Question
Reply to Commentators
| Obras citantes distintas | 48 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 2,53 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2007 - 2026 (20) |
| Velocidade de citação | current |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 46 |