Aristotle on Religion

Mor Segev presents a plausible and powerfully argued resolution to a fundamental problem regarding Aristotle's attitude toward traditional Greek religion. On one hand, Aristotle maintains that anthropomorphic depictions of the gods play a positive and in fact essential role in the state. On the other hand, he claims that these depictions are false, and in some cases pernicious; for example, contrary to the poets' lies, the gods are literally incapable of jealousy. But if so, why does he nonetheless propose that the ideal state must preserve traditional religious practices and institutions? More generally, how are we to understand the conservative attitude Aristotle sometimes expresses toward traditional religion within the context of his metaphysical view of god as Prime Mover, whose absolute self-sufficiency precludes any need (or ability) to deliberate and any concern for (or awareness of) particular human beings?Segev responds by noting first that, for Aristotle, the polis comes to be not for the sake of merely living, but for the sake of living well. So any component of the polis that is necessary must be necessary, ultimately, for allowing and enabling human beings to achieve their highest end, which we know to be theoretical contemplation from Nicomachean Ethics 10. Thus Segev's thesis is that traditional religion, with its false, anthropomorphic depictions of the gods, is a necessary part of the educational process that leads to knowledge of first philosophy, thereby making the life of theoretical contemplation possible.The outline of this position is set forth clearly and concisely in the introduction, which includes a synopsis of the book's five chapters. Segev's first task, in chapter 1, is to confirm that Aristotle does indeed consider two foundational claims of traditional religion to be false, namely that anthropomorphic gods exist and that they behave in ways that express a providential concern for human affairs. This sets the stage for the main defense of his view in chapters 2 and 3, where Segev explains why Aristotle thinks it is both natural and necessary to establish institutions and practices in the city that perpetuate false depictions of the gods, and why the gods of traditional religion are the proper tools to accomplish this end. In the first place, the sense of wonder inspired by exposure to depictions of anthropomorphic gods leads those who are philosophically inclined to seek to better understand the nature of the divine. When properly guided, this initial sense of wonder produces knowledge of the true gods and first philosophy. In the second place, we can see why only anthropomorphic depictions of the gods can serve this educational role by considering the fact that, despite failing to exist, they satisfy the general definition of god as immortal living thing, while also resembling human beings by being politically and socially active. Their similarity to us makes it easy to identify with them. But once we do, our (properly guided) wonder leads us to investigate what identifying with the divine in ourselves really amounts to. As we grasp the true nature of our theoretical rationality, we presumably begin to see the deficiency of anthropomorphic gods, and transfer our attention to the true gods and the life of contemplation.In chapter 4, Segev applies this attitude toward traditional religion to Aristotle's references to religious myths. We might think that when Aristotle approves of some myth it is an expression of his view that reputable opinions typically contain some truth that may be extracted and made precise. In the case of traditional myths, the truths to be extracted are strictly pragmatic, having to do with the promotion of social stability and moral development; they do not directly reveal anything about the nature of the gods or our proper relation to them. So when Aristotle rejects a myth it is because it fails to advance those practical ends, not because they are false, or more false than other myths. Indeed, while Aristotle thinks that all myths are false, he also thinks they all may serve their natural, political purpose by inspiring the wonder we need to press on to our natural, intellectual fulfillment, which in turn leads to the fulfillment of the polis.Chapter 5 contains a fascinating look at Aristotle's influence on Maimonides and Albertus Magnus with respect to the necessity of relying on false anthropomorphic depictions in parables, metaphors, and other devices to arrive at knowledge of the true God. Segev's general historical point that Aristotle has had an enormous impact on theology in Abrahamic traditions is no doubt correct. But, of course, the controversial issue is whether Segev's interpretation of Aristotle is correct, even with the considerable weight provided by these philosophers' endorsements.Are the anthropomorphic depictions of traditional religion really necessary to induce a sense of wonder at the divine? Is this sense of wonder really the necessary precursor to philosophical investigation into the nature of the true gods? Even if we allow that all forms of wonder at the gods may lead to philosophical investigation, this supposedly natural and necessary starting point does not seem to feature prominently in Aristotle's own efforts to lead his students, or at least his readers, to the knowledge of first philosophy and the life of theoretical contemplation.For example, in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle does not explicitly leverage a sense of wonder at the anthropomorphic gods of traditional religion. Although he does describe happiness as godlike, initially on the basis of its etymology, he makes no reference to the gods when showing that happiness, the highest human good, must be final (pursued for its own sake) and self-sufficient (requiring virtually no external aid for its successful performance); nor does he refer to the gods when he appeals to the natural function of human beings to establish his initial definition (Nichomachean Ethics 1.7). All of this would seem to be perfectly intelligible with or without a sense of wonder at the gods. Similarly, when he recapitulates the main argument and finally establishes that theoretical contemplation meets the criteria, he does not seem to rely on or presuppose the requisite sense of wonder (10.6–8).In his final word on the nature of happiness in 10.8, before the transitional passage to the Politics, he does argue that if the gods care for human affairs, as they seem to (hosper dokei, which Segev translates “as people think”), they would love, honor, and reward those who devote themselves to what the gods themselves love, namely theoretical contemplation. Since the wise person is most loved by the gods, he would seem to be happiest. It is not clear, however, how this argument, especially given its important position at the end of the discourse, is meant to prompt further inquiry into the nature of the true gods, as Segev requires (89). Instead, Aristotle appears to be reassuring his readers that the theoretical life is pious and happiest even within the context of traditional religion. Indeed, given Aristotle's directions in his will to set up votive gifts to Demeter, Athena, and Zeus, we might think that this final argument of the Ethics is meant to reassure himself as well. I find this at least as convincing as Segev's view that Aristotle's pious provisions were really a sort of bequest to future citizens, intended to preserve and promote a sense of wonder at nonexistent gods who would care about such things if they existed (170).Similarly, Aristotle need not be seen as leading his readers from a traditional view of the gods to his own cosmological account in Metaphysics Λ. About halfway through that book, he arrives at his view about theoretical contemplation, the happiness that god continuously enjoys, without any prior reference to traditional gods and thus without any explicit effort to leverage a sense of wonder at them. Now someone brought up with no exposure to such gods might very well follow his reasoning and possibly even take up a life of theoretical contemplation as a result. As Segev acknowledges, the unmoved movers are intelligible in themselves without any mythical coverings (61). So if their life of theoretical contemplation is also intelligible in its own terms, traditional religion is not pedagogically necessary after all.Segev himself seems somewhat ambivalent on this necessity when he says that religion is “useful” for arriving at knowledge of first philosophy (82, 106) and when he describes the traditional gods as the “proper tools” for motivating people to learn the truth about the real gods (89, 109). Granted, it is easier to get people interested in such anthropomorphic beings insofar as we take pleasure in what is akin to ourselves. But the easier route is not the necessary route: we also take pleasure in learning that, in Aristotle's compressed expression in the Poetics, this is that (hoti houtos ekeinos, 1.4)—in other words, that this object or person properly falls under that description or category. And we take delight in discovering the formal beauty of the interdependent structures of natural organisms of even the meanest sort. In a famous passage from Parts of Animals (1.5), Aristotle observes that there is wonder in every natural thing, by which he means that the divine manifests itself throughout all of nature, even in the humblest of places and things. Although he contrasts the study of sublunary natural organisms with the study of the heavens and the gods, Aristotle must have thought that all such wonders, pursued to their limits, could only properly end in the realization of the true nature of god as Prime Mover. So while exposure to depictions of anthropomorphized gods may well be a useful route to knowledge of first philosophy, it does not seem to be necessary to explain the natural function of traditional religion.Accordingly, it seems we should reconsider a possibility that Segev rejects (77–82), namely, that the natural and necessary function of traditional religion is primarily to secure and promote social stability and moral development, even if it also may be used to stimulate theological investigations. If we interpret the need for religion as of a piece with the need for food and security, and more importantly for some form of institutionalized justice (Politics 7.7), it would make more sense to see it as necessary for the cohesion of its citizenry and the stability of the state. The members of a political community need, we might say, a set of stories that explain their collective position in the world.Aristotle clearly thought that anthropomorphic depictions of the gods are to be rejected as false. But on the basis of his many and varied descriptions of things as divine, and given how deeply traditional religion permeates all aspects of Greek culture, it seems likely that Aristotle's attitude toward the gods is more problematic than Segev's resolution allows. Nevertheless, Aristotle on Religion is an invigorating and important contribution to the discussion of these issues

Aesthetics · Contemplation · Context (archaeology) · Epistemology · Ideal (ethics) · Metaphysics · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Philosophy · Religion and Society Interactions · Religious Studies and Spiritual Practices