What Kant Might Have Said
Moral Worth and the Overdetermination of Dutiful Action
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10697320 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Richard G Henson (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1979 |
| Volume | 88 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 39 |
| Publication date | 1979-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2184778 |
| OpenAlex | W2021185941 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 38 |
M Y purpose is to account for some oddities in what Kant did and did not say about worth, and for another in what commentators tell us about his intent. The stone with which hope to dispatch these several birds is-as one would expect a philosopher's stone to be-a distinction. distinguish between two things Kant might have had in mind under the heading of moral worth. They come readily to mind when one both takes account of what he actually said about it and notices a fact which he did not seem to notice: namely, that dutiful actionaction which, whatever its motive, fulfills a duty-can be overdetermined, and determined in particular by both respect for duty and some consortium of inclinations and prudence. It may be otiose to begin by reminding the reader of another and more familiar distinction-that which Kant draws between an action's conforming to duty and its having moral worth-but since such distinguished commentators as Broad, Sidgwick, and Ross have so seriously misrepresented Kant when they discussed these notions,' a few words on them seem advisable. The first formulation of the Categorical Imperative is: I should never act in such a way that could not will that my
Action (physics) · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · General interest · Overdetermination · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · War, Ethics, and Justification
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Morality and Sensibility in Kant
Does Kant's ethics require that the moral law be the sole determining ground of the will
Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe
Merits and Implications
Extending the Account
The Recursive Account
Degrees of Virtue and Vice
How Great a Good Is Virtue?
Varieties of Virtue and Vice
Attitudes, Beliefs, and Love as a Condition of Value
Against Virtue Ethics
Sovereign Reason
Statist Cosmopolitanism
Kant and the Moral Worth of Actions
Schiller's Critique of Kant's Moral Psychology
Virtue, Vice, and Value
Cruel Intentions and Evil Deeds
The Moral Worth of Mixed Actions
The Moral Irrelevance of Constitutive Luck
Moral worth, right reasons and counterfactual motives
Moral Worth and Moral Belief
Equal Moral Opportunity
Do we have a right to education or a duty to educate ourselves? An enquiry based on Fichte’s views on education
Kant on Duty in the Groundwork
Consequentialism and Moral Worth
Kant’s moral theory as a guide in philanthropy
Kant On Moral Agency and Women's Nature
Acting for the Right Reasons
The Fit-Based Definition of Recognition Respect
From the Good Will to the Formula of Universal Law 1
Moral Worth and Moral Knowledge
Doubts about Duty as a Secondary Motive
Accidentally Doing the Right Thing
Valor Moral Em Kant
From Duty, Moral Worth, Good Will
La psychanalyse et les fondements de la morale
Compassion and Moral Worth
| Unique citing works | 38 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,97 |
| Citation span | 1987 - 2026 (40) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 35 |