The Double Lives of Objects

Thomas Sattig's The Double Lives of Objects introduces a new theory of ordinary objects and applies it to some old and new puzzles. The theory, perspectival hylomorphism, has two parts. The metaphysical part is quasi-hylomorphism. It says that ordinary objects are compounds of matter and formlike facts. The semantic part is perspectivalism. It says that we shift our modes of predication in line with different conceptual perspectives on ordinary objects. Combining the parts provides a novel strategy for resolving puzzles about ordinary objects. The result is an original and well-crafted contribution to the metaphysics of objects. I will give an overview of Sattig's book followed by a discussion.Quasi-hylomorphism (chapter 1) says that an ordinary object is a compound of a material part and a formal part. The material part is a material subject. This is a classical mereological sum of material parts in space and time, or in space-time. (Sattig offers both three-dimensionalist and four-dimensionalist formulations of his key points.) The formal part is a “K-path” (“K” for “kind”). A K-path is not material in Sattig's sense. It is a peculiar series (or conjunction) of facts. Each fact in the series describes the “sortalish” properties (using Karen Bennett's [2004] term) of material subjects at a time. This makes K-paths somewhat like forms. But they are not the Aristotelian's mysterious “principles” or “structures.” This makes quasi-hylomorphism quasi. Sattig says this is an improvement over the Aristotelian hylomorphisms of Kit Fine (1999), Kathrin Koslicki (2008), and others. Another improvement is a simpler view of how a formal part relates to a hylomorphic compound. A K-path is just a classical mereological part of such a compound. This avoids the need to appeal to a further notion of compounding. To illustrate, consider a statue. Its material subject is the sum of its current material parts. Its formal part is its “statue”-path describing the “statue-ish” properties of its material subjects at a time.Perspectivalism (chapter 2) says we switch between different modes of predication. These modes pair with different conceptual perspectives toward ordinary objects. The sortal-insensitive perspective conceives of objects without regard to their sortalish features. This mirrors a material mode of predication ascribing a property to an object's maximal material part. The sortal-sensitive perspective conceives of objects by their sortalish features. This mirrors a formal mode of predication ascribing a property to a material subject of an object's K-path. (Sattig allows for a fundamental, absolute mode but sets it aside.) Sattig claims that we switch between these perspectives and their matching modes. He justifies this claim by the psychology of object representation (sec. 2.1.3) and interpretative charity (sec. 2.3.2).Perspectival hylomorphism combines quasi-hylomorphism and perspectivalism. It provides for a novel strategy for resolving many puzzles about ordinary objects. The strategy views each puzzle as generated by conflating modes of predication. The puzzle is then resolved by disentangling these modes.The puzzle of coincidence gives a simple illustration (chapter 3). We incline to identify a statue and a piece of clay because they coincide. We also incline to distinguish them because only the clay survives reshaping into a ball. Our inclinations appear to conflict. But Sattig's strategy promises to avoid the conflict without violating our inclinations. From a sortal-insensitive perspective, the statue and the clay have the same material subjects. So it is correct materially to predicate identity to them. From a sortal-sensitive perspective, the statue and the clay have distinct “forms” (K-paths). So it is correct formally to predicate distinctness to them. Distinguishing these modes of predications removes the conflict and vindicates our inclinations. Sattig applies the strategy to various puzzles. Some are familiar: fission (chapter 4), de re modality (chapter 5), and the problem of the many (chapter 7). Others are new: cheap indeterminism (chapter 6) and relativistic change (chapter 8).There are more worthwhile ideas and arguments in Sattig's book than I have space to discuss here. My focus will be on perspectival hylomorphism's main intended application. This is to what Sattig calls “ordinary objects.” Sattig denies that ordinary objects are metaphysically special. But they are pretheoretically special to us. Ordinary objects have a special role in our conceptual scheme. Nevertheless, I will discuss some perplexities about how Sattig conceives of them. These obscure what Sattig's theory is about. That in turn obscures the psychological support for the theory. It also obscures the relevance of its resolutions to the puzzles.Sattig says that our concept of ordinary object requires that ordinary objects be sortable (sec. 2.2.1). Sortable objects contrast with their environment. They are also continuous, connected, causally unified, and maximally intrinsic in certain respects. These conditions approximate a prohibition on “externality” (my term, not Sattig's). If the properties individuating an object are too “external,” then the object is unsortable. Sattig illustrates this with John Hawthorne's example of a restaurant moving locations by the signing of a contract. The restaurant's location does not depend only on its intrinsic features. It also depends on an external act (the signing). This externality implies unsortability in Sattig's sense. It follows that restaurants are not ordinary objects. Sattig suggests instead that restaurants might be “social entities, along with institutions and states” (34).But it is not clear that social entities and ordinary objects deserve separate treatment. Consider recent hylomorphic approaches to social entities (e.g., by Asya Passinsky [2016] and Katherine Ritchie [2013]). For example, a sports team might be a compound of sports structure (its “form”) and players (its “matter”). Social entities and ordinary objects alike would be hylomorphic compounds. One would then expect it possible for there to be a uniform hylomorphic approach to both. In particular, one might hope perspectival hylomorphism would apply to both. But Sattig's sortability requirement stymies this hope.Social entities aside, it is not evident what is extraordinary about unsortable objects. It is odd to call restaurants (institutions, states) “objects,” let alone “ordinary objects” or “social objects.” But this oddness alone seems too feeble to justify the sortability requirement. And there are reasons to doubt that ordinary objects must be sortable in Sattig's sense.Consider artifacts. Many of these—tables, knives, artworks—are about as ordinary as it gets. It is also plausible to individuate these artifacts externally by our purposes, or those of original crafters. (Lynne Ruder Baker [2004], Daniel Korman [2015], Amie Thomasson [2007], and others defend such an approach.) Even if this makes artifacts unsortable, it does not make them seem any less ordinary. But Sattig cannot regard them as ordinary if they are unsortable. They would then be beyond the reach of perspectival hylomorphism. That would be a disappointing limitation of Sattig's theory. What's more, some of Sattig's examples of ordinary objects, such as statues and letters, are artifacts. They won't be ordinary objects if their external individuation makes them unsortable. That would be a failure of Sattig's theory to apply to the cases meant to illustrate its applications.All this led me to wonder why Sattig required ordinary objects to be sortable. It might have been to avoid foreseeable difficulties extending the theory to unsortable objects. But then acknowledging the difficulties would have helped (even if only to set them aside). Or if the extension were easier, why then focus on a conception of ordinary objects so resistant to the extension?I do not wish to deny that there might be a coherent notion of an “ordinary” object requiring sortability. But such a notion is not the only available notion. Nor is it clear, given the preceding examples, why it should command a central role in a theory of objects.Fixating on sortability would be unfair if downplaying it preserved Sattig's theory. But the sortability requirement is not an idle wheel. Nor is it an innocent constraint for focusing the topic. Instead, it plays a key role in Sattig's search for psychological support for perspectivalism.Influential research by Elizabeth Spelke (1990) and other psychologists provides the envisioned support. Sattig interprets their research as evidence for a shift in object representation. Infants primarily represent objects in a sortal-insensitive way. Adults primarily represent objects in a sortal-sensitive way. Sattig claims the shift is best explained by sortal-sensitive representation supplementing sortal-insensitive representation. This corresponds to the sortal-sensitive perspective supplementing the sortal-insensitive perspective. And that corresponds to the formal mode of predication supplementing the material mode.Sattig's preferred description of the shift clashes with the sortability requirement. He describes the shift as the formal mode of predication supplementing the material mode. But there is a more befitting description. Suppose that ordinary objects must be sortable. Then, representing objects in a sortal-sensitive way amounts to representing ordinary objects. So infants primarily do not represent ordinary objects whereas adults primarily do. This encourages an alternative description of the shift. It is that representing ordinary objects supplements representing material objects.The availability of this alternative description poses a difficulty for Sattig. The alternative description is compatible with only one mode of predication. Adults do not gain a new mode of predication. There is just one mode common to infants and adults alike. What adults gain is the ability to predicate to new things: ordinary objects. If so, this obviates perspectivalism's posit of two modes of predication. So, the shift won't support perspectivalism unless the alternative description is excluded. But I did not see on what principled grounds Sattig might exclude it. Indeed, the alternative description befits the sortability requirement more than Sattig's description does.This difficulty also threatens Sattig's strategy for resolving the puzzles. To illustrate, consider again the puzzle of coincidence. Sattig attempts to vindicate our conviction that ordinary objects are identical if coincident. He appeals to the material mode of predication. His claim is that two ordinary objects materially are identical if coincident. But consider the alternative description with a single mode of predication. Reformulate Sattig's claim to fit. Then two material objects are identical if coincident. This reformulation concerns material objects such as the statue's matter. It no longer concerns ordinary objects such as the statue itself. So it is unclear how it is relevant to vindicating our conviction that ordinary objects are identical if coincident.My perplexity over Sattig's conception of ordinary objects left me unclear on what perspectival hylomorphism is a theory of. Sometimes it felt as if the conception was molded to fit the theory and the psychological support meant for it. This obscured whether the psychology does support the theory. It also obscured the theory's strategy for resolving the puzzles. But none of this diminishes Sattig's impressive book. The Double Lives of Objects is a double achievement for being a significant contribution and for the influence I expect it will have.Thanks to Daniel Z. Korman, Colin Marshall, and Asya Passinsky for their helpful feedback

Analytic philosophy · Art · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · General interest · Literature · Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

• Objects

  Daniel Z Korman•Objects•2015

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• The Structure of Objects

  Kathrin Koslicki•The structure of objects•2008

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• Principles of Object Perception

  Open Access•Elizabeth S Spelke•Cognitive Science•1990

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• Things and Their Parts

  Open Access•Kit Fine•Midwest Studies in Philosophy•1999

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• Spatio-Temporal Coincidence and the Grounding Problem

  Open Access•Karen Bennett•Philosophical Studies•2004

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• Artifacts and Human Concepts

  Amie L Thomasson•Creations of the Mind•2007

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