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Volition and Basic Action

Bibliographic Data

ID10697829
AuthorsHugh J Mccann (corresponding author), Hugh McCann
Year1974
Volume83
Issue4
Pages451
Publication date1974-10-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
PublisherJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2183915
OpenAlexW2314589903
LanguageEN
Citations received15

THE purpose of this paper is to defend the view that the bodily actions of men typically involve a mental action of volition or willing, and that such mental acts are, in at least one important sense, the basic actions we perform when we do things like raise an arm, move a finger, or flex a muscle. The defense will be theoretically oriented, concentrating on the advantages of a proper account of volition for solving certain general problems about action, rather than on providing independent evidence that volition occurs. To be sure, the latter emphasis deserves full development also. But space does not permit performing both tasks, and it is easier to search for something after one knows what one is looking for and what its value is. Knowing these things requires a theoretical development; hence the present task deserves priority. Since I shall maintain that volition itself counts as action, I cannot argue that it is the key to understanding the nature of action generally. It does, however, provide a solution to what I shall call the action-result problem. This is the problem that gives rise to Wittgenstein's question, What is left over if I substract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm?'1 A strong theoretical case for volition will have been made if it can be shown to lay this problem to rest. Along the way, we shall see that a theory of volition sheds considerable light on other important matters as well

Action (physics) · Cognitive science · Linguistics · Volition (linguistics) · Neuroscience · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications

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Unique citing works15
Citations per year0,32
Citation span1979 - 2025 (47)
Citation velocityrecent
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 15

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