Volition and Basic Action
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10697829 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Hugh J Mccann (corresponding author), Hugh McCann |
| Year | 1974 |
| Volume | 83 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 451 |
| Publication date | 1974-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2183915 |
| OpenAlex | W2314589903 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 15 |
THE purpose of this paper is to defend the view that the bodily actions of men typically involve a mental action of volition or willing, and that such mental acts are, in at least one important sense, the basic actions we perform when we do things like raise an arm, move a finger, or flex a muscle. The defense will be theoretically oriented, concentrating on the advantages of a proper account of volition for solving certain general problems about action, rather than on providing independent evidence that volition occurs. To be sure, the latter emphasis deserves full development also. But space does not permit performing both tasks, and it is easier to search for something after one knows what one is looking for and what its value is. Knowing these things requires a theoretical development; hence the present task deserves priority. Since I shall maintain that volition itself counts as action, I cannot argue that it is the key to understanding the nature of action generally. It does, however, provide a solution to what I shall call the action-result problem. This is the problem that gives rise to Wittgenstein's question, What is left over if I substract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm?'1 A strong theoretical case for volition will have been made if it can be shown to lay this problem to rest. Along the way, we shall see that a theory of volition sheds considerable light on other important matters as well
Action (physics) · Cognitive science · Linguistics · Volition (linguistics) · Neuroscience · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
Agency and answerability
A Philosophy of Criminal Attempts
Motivation and agency
Intensionality and Identity in Human Action and Philosophical Method
Causal Deviance in Brain–Computer Interfaces (BCIs)
Trying without fail
The phenomenology and metaphysics of the open future
Sharing uncertainty
A logic of intention and attempt
Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities
Group Action Without Group Minds
Is agent-causality a conceptual primitive
Intention, cognitive commitment, and planning
Actions, cognition and the self
Mental action
| Unique citing works | 15 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,32 |
| Citation span | 1979 - 2025 (47) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 15 |