How Is Perception Tractable

Bibliographic Data

ID10697857
AuthorsTyler Brooke-Wilson (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume132
Issue2
Pages239-292
Publication date2023-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
PublisherDuke University Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1215/00318108-10294422
OpenAlexW4381295185
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited68

Perception solves computationally demanding problems at lightning fast speed. It recovers sophisticated representations of the world from degraded inputs, often in a matter of milliseconds. Any theory of perception must be able to explain how this is possible; in other words, it must be able to explain perception’s computational tractability. One of the few attempts to move toward such an explanation is the information encapsulation hypothesis, which posits that perception can be fast because it keeps computational costs low by forgoing access to information stored in cognition. I argue that we have no compelling reason to believe that encapsulation explains (or even contributes to an explanation of) perceptual tractability, and much reason to doubt it. This is because there exist much deeper computational challenges for perception than information access, and these threaten to make the costs of access irrelevant. If this is right, it undermines a core computational motivation for encapsulation and sends us back to the drawing board for explanations of perceptual tractability

Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Perception · Computer Science · Face Recognition and Perception · Neural dynamics and brain function · Philosophy · Psychology · Visual perception and processing mechanisms

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