Indicative and Subjunctive Conditionals

Bibliographic Data

ID10697954
AuthorsWilbur A Davis (0000-0001-7545-1031, corresponding author), Wayne A Davis
Year1979
Volume88
Issue4
Pages544
Publication date1979-10-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
PublisherJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2184844
OpenAlexW2323441741
LanguageEN
Citations received10
References cited3

Indicative and subjunctive conditionals have different truth conditions. I seek to account for this difference within the general possible-worlds framework developed by Stalnaker and Lewis. I argue that their truth conditions hold for indicative conditionals, and that similar but different conditions hold for subjunctive conditionals. An indicative conditional is true only if its consequent is true in the antecedent-world that is most similar to the actual world overall. A subjunctive conditional is true only if its consequent is true in the antecedent-world that is most similar to the actual world before the antecedent event. A whole set of extant counterexamples to the Stalnaker-Lewis account of subjunctives confirms it for indicatives. This simple development renders similarity theory both more general and more accurate. I also point out that a subjunctive conditional is incorrect in some way if its consequent refers to an earlier time than its antecedent. Indicative and subjunctive independence will be briefly defined and distinguished

Linguistics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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