Truth Rules, Hoverflies, and the Kripke-Wittgenstein Paradox

Bibliographic Data

ID10698027
AuthorsRuth Garrett Millikan (0000-0003-1513-1049, corresponding author)
Year1990
Volume99
Issue3
Pages323
Publication date1990-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
PublisherJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2185347
OpenAlexW1522736553
LanguageEN
Citations received29

The challenge is a welcome one. Although I will argue that the Kripke-Wittgenstein paradox is not a problem for naturalists only, I will propose a naturalist solution to it. (Should the Kripke-Wittgenstein paradox prove to be soluble from a naturalist standpoint but intractable from other standpoints, that would, I suppose, constitute an argument for naturalism.) Then I will show that the paradox and its solution have an important consequence for the theories of meaning and truth. The Kripke-Wittgenstein arguments which pose the paradox also put in question Dummett's and Putnam's view of language understanding. From this view it follows that truth must be verificationist rules that assign assertability conditions to sentences, rather than realist rules that assign correspondence truth conditions. The proposed solution to the paradox suggests another view of language understanding, according to which a speaker can express, through his language practice, a grasp of correspondence truth rules. This will block one route of Putnam's famous retreat from realism

Analytic philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · Kripke semantics · Kripke structure · Multimodal logic · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Historical Linguistics and Language Studies · Philosophy