Descartes's Validation of Clear and Distinct Apprehension

T HE Meditations seem to have a geometric structure; Descartes seems to begin from axioms, to deduce the theorem is a veracious from these axioms, and to offer the proposition All which I clearly and distinctly apprehend is as a corollary of this theorem. There are, of course, two difficulties with this interpretation: first, since Descartes asserts his axioms simply because he clearly and distinctly apprehends them, he seems to use a theorem of his system to assure himself, in retrospect, that he was justified in having asserted the axioms from which he deduced it. Second, since he becomes certain that the propositions which he clearly and distinctly apprehends are true by proving that there is a veracious God, and since he later constructs the argument All which I clearly and distinctly apprehend is true; I clearly and distinctly apprehend that God exists; therefore, God exists (Meditation V; HR I, 180-1),' he seems to use a proposition to assure himself, again in retrospect, that he wasjustified in having asserted the theorem of which it was an immediate corollary. My aim is to show that, despite these appearances, the strategy of the Meditations is not objectionably circular. The outline of my argument is this: Descartes conceived of belief and doubt in causal terms. He believed, in particular, that there are mental states in whose presence doubt is causally impossible. To produce these states, he constructs the arguments of Meditations III and IV. He then offers the proposition All which I clearly and distinctly apprehend is to record the observation that (as a matter of psychological fact) he is unable to doubt that which he has clearly and distinctly apprehended. Since his warrant for asserting this

Apprehension · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · General interest · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Historical Philosophy and Science · Philosophy · Psychology

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