A Theory of Practical Reason
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10698610 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Robert Binkley (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1965 |
| Volume | 74 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 423 |
| Publication date | 1965-10-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2183122 |
| OpenAlex | W2335198051 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
IT HAS not escaped the notice of philosophers that in talking and thinking about conduct and about practical deliberation and decision, we employ the same vocabulary of rationality that we use in discussing the purely intellectual operations of the mind. Thus conduct may be reasonable or unreasonable, decision what to do may be well or ill founded, and I may be asked for the grounds of my choice as well as the grounds of my inference. It is therefore not surprising that philosophers have talked as if there were a practical syllogism, a practical reason, a logic of the will to set beside the much-studied syllogism, reason, and logic of the intellect. There are, to be sure, familiar objections to taking this notion of practical reason seriously-that is, as anything more than an illuminating metaphor. They all have to do with the idea that theoretical reason has a special relation to truth, which so-called practical reason must necessarily lack. Nevertheless, the purpose of the present essay is to develop such a serious nonmetaphorical concept of practical reason. That is to say, I try to find a way of thinking about the operations of the will and intellect that will permit the vocabulary of rationality to be employed in both spheres without any shift in meaning. In particular, what is needed is a general concept of validity that will apply univocally both to theoretical and to practical reasoning. A theory of practical reason must then be developed as a part of a theory of reason in general
Analytic philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · General interest · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy
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| Citations per year | 0.15 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1979 - 2019 (41) |
| Highly cited | No |