The Will to Reason

C. P. Ragland's The Will to Reason: Theodicy and Freedom in Descartes is an insightful, impeccably scholarly engagement with some serious metaphysical questions. Most of the book deals with freedom, leading to a consideration of freedom and divine providence, and “addresses a final place where Reason seems to contradict itself for Descartes” (8). The conjunction of theodicy and freedom captures the book's importance. Ragland offers an impressively painstaking, detailed work on a conception of freedom, crucial to which is Ragland's defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), “according to which an agent does something freely only if she could have done otherwise. . . . If PAP is correct, then freedom consists in a ‘two-way power’ to do or not do something” (84). Ragland's determination to defend PAP is striking.The Will to Reason joins a number of philosophical works that take Descartes's conception of freedom seriously, and builds on Ragland's work on the topic in recent years. Whether Ragland's analysis of freedom and his “pro-PAP reading” (6) capture Descartes's conception of freedom will be considered below.Ragland covers far too many issues for me to do justice to here. I shall focus on freedom and discuss three crucial passages on which Ragland draws in support of his attribution of the PAP to Descartes. I begin with a few remarks on Ragland's view of error and the inconsistency of reason.Ragland presents an antinomy that occupies substantial parts of his book: for Descartes “we err freely” and “nothing can happen except according to God's providential plan” (232). But Descartes states: “no one . . . expressly wishes to go wrong,” no one errs freely; “there is scarcely anyone who does not often wish to give his assent to something which, though he does not know it, contains error” (my emphasis). The nature of error is “privation or lack of some knowledge which somehow should be in me” (AT VII.60). Falling into error, for Descartes, is a case of precipitateness or habitual misuse of the will.Throughout, Ragland refers to the possibility that God has given the meditator “a deceiving nature,” but by this he means the possibility that the meditator has been given “a nature such that [he or she] was deceived” (AT VII.36). It's a pity that this wasn't picked up in the editing process, especially as it becomes central to what Ragland calls “the deceiving nature argument” (18–19, 33, 34, 36–37, 39–41, 45, 232).Ragland claims to find Descartes, in Meditations I, “[raising] the prospect that [Reason's] . . . best deliverances might be inconsistent by rational standards” (83). This seems to misinterpret Descartes's method of scrutiny, putting forward a statement and immediately cross-examining it. However, Ragland argues that in the “Second and Third Meditations, Descartes lays this prospect to rest by proving the existence of God” (83). Well, not in the Second; more seriously, if reason “can be inconsistent with itself,” can “undermine itself” (83), it's difficult to see how the meditator can prove the existence of God, or move beyond Meditations I.The “core interpretative question of the book [is]: what is freedom for Descartes?” (71). Ragland presents the following as Descartes's definition of freedom: “the will [in its essential and strict sense] simply consists in our ability to do or not do something (that is, to affirm or deny, to pursue or avoid); or rather [vel potius], it consists simply in the fact that we do not feel we are determined by any external forces” (84; see also AT VII.57). Ragland finds that the “first clause defines freedom as a two-way power . . . and hence evidence for PAP. The second part of the definition defines freedom as ‘spontaneity’” (85; see also AT VII.59).First, though, this is not Descartes's definition of freedom, but his characterization of what the will is essentially and strictly: an “ability to do or not do something” (AT VII.57). Second, the vel potius clause elucidates the first—what the will is and our sense of lack of external forces. “Spontaneity” doesn't figure until two paragraphs after what Ragland regards as Descartes's definition. It's the next statement, and the ensuing paragraphs, that prepares the ground for Descartes's notion of freedom of spontaneity: “In order to be free, there is no need for me to be inclined both ways; on the contrary, the more I incline in one direction [toward truth and goodness] the freer is my choice” (AT VIII.57–58). Freedom allows (qualitative) degrees.The passage provides no support for Ragland's claim: “two-way power and spontaneity are two sides of the same coin . . . the two notions are not separable: any free act with one must also have the other” (86). This seems to ignore indifference (contrasted with spontaneity): man “is never indifferent except when he does not know which of the two alternatives is the better or truer” (AT VII.433). If the two-way thesis were transposed onto freedom, Descartes would relegate it to the lowest degree of worthiness, to “indifference [which] does not belong to the essence of human freedom” (AT VII.433; AT VII.58), contrary to Ragland's claim that “the two-way power is essential to human freedom” for Descartes (104).Ragland suggests: “In the Meditations Descartes never explicitly says he enjoys a two-way power with respect to clear perceptions. He only implies this. . . . But in the Principles, Descartes does explicitly say...that we can (Principles 37)...withhold assent from clear perceptions. His commitment to PAP is less ambiguous in the Principles” (122–24).Principles I.37 states: “It is a supreme perfection in man that he acts voluntarily, that is, freely.” Here, Ragland argues, “Descartes equates freedom with voluntariness,” the “rest of the passage commits him to PAP” (123).In the rest of the passage, Descartes contrasts rational human beings and automata: “We do not praise automatons for accurately producing all the movements they were designed to perform, because the production of these movements occurs necessarily.” Rather: “It is the designer who is praised for constructing such carefully-made devices; for in constructing them he acted not out of necessity but freely. By the same principle, when we embrace the truth, our doing so voluntarily is much more to our credit than would be the case if we could not do otherwise.”Ragland argues: “Since necessity and freedom are opposed . . . the absence of necessity entails some kind of ability to do otherwise, this remark commits Descartes to PAP” (123). Ragland concludes: “Descartes maintains, we assent voluntarily and freely [to a clearly perceived truth], and therefore could do otherwise” (124).This poses a problem for Ragland's interpretation. By “if we could not do otherwise” Descartes clearly means: if we were unable not to “embrace the truth.” This is consistent with Meditations IV: I cannot but spontaneously assent to “something which I understood so clearly was true” (AT VII.58; AT VII.69; AT VII.158). If we moved from preprogrammed necessity we would be exempt from praise which is appropriate to rational beings such as the designer, not to automata. Descartes concludes: “By the same principle, when we embrace the truth, our doing so voluntarily is much more to our credit” than if we were automata and moved from mechanistic necessity. Indeed, what would it mean to do otherwise in the face of what is true—to assent to falsehood? It seems so, since Ragland states: “This positive power is a two-way power for opposites [endorsing] PAP” (127). This is manifestly impossible, because clear and distinct perceptions and falsehood are contradictory. There is no room in Descartes's freedom of spontaneity for PAP.Passage AT IV.173 from the letter seems prima facie to support Ragland's defense of PAP. It reads: “When a very evident reason moves us in one direction, although morally speaking we can hardly move in the contrary direction, absolutely speaking we can. For it is always open to us to hold back from pursuing a clearly known good, or from admitting a clearly perceived truth, provided we consider it a good thing to demonstrate the freedom of our will by so doing.”Ragland states: the “letter's ‘absolute’ two-way power” means that for Descartes “we can ‘absolutely speaking’ choose otherwise than we do, even if our choices are always determined by the intellect” (130). Ragland rightly recognizes that metaphysical freedom is an all-or- nothing notion, but seems to think that this conflicts with Descartes's notion of degrees of freedom. To resolve this apparent conflict, Ragland argues that Descartes distinguishes between “absolute” hypothetical two-way power, and “moral” categorical two-way power.For Descartes, degrees of freedom are qualitative: freedom can be of higher or lower degrees of quality or worth. The lower are connected with indifference, error, and ultimately sin; the higher with spontaneity, truth, and goodness. Ragland draws further distinctions, between hypothetical and categorical scenarios, between epistemic and nonepistemic reasons, in defense of PAP.Such attempts remain unconvincing. For Descartes, morally speaking, or as a matter of fact grounded in the essence of freedom of spontaneity, we cannot but assent to reason's clear sight of truth and goodness: we're struck by truth. We can hardly move in the contrary direction from a clearly known good, because it would be contrary to good reasons to do so. Absolutely speaking, it's logically possible to hold back (not deny or shift one's attention) from reason's clear sight of truth and goodness. It is overhasty to conclude that PAP is necessary to the essence of freedom of spontaneity. The fact that Descartes finds it compelling to immediately add: “provided we consider it a good thing to demonstrate the freedom of our will by so doing” demonstrates that he has neither contradicted his arguments in Meditations IV nor changed his mind in favor of PAP.Even absolutely speaking we don't say no to that clearly known good: we simply hold back, which requires having good reasons. Why would we consider it a good thing to demonstrate our freedom of spontaneity? Because we see clearly that freedom of spontaneity is “the greatest good the supreme good [. . .] the noblest thing we can have” (AT V.81–86). The will's spontaneous assent to that clear fact requires no hypothetical or categorical or change of circumstances, because the mind “can still think of more than one thing [at the same time]” (AT V.148). By holding back from a clearly known good we make explicit the freedom of spontaneity—which makes us “in a special way the author[s] of [our] actions” (Principles I.37).The Mesland letter of 1645 establishes that holding back is in fact an application of Descartes's freedom of spontaneity, not an exception to it, or a defense of PAP—otherwise the proviso would make no sense. Where various interpretations go wrong is in taking things the other way round, thinking that it's an exception to his freedom of spontaneity or an acceptance of PAP. But for Descartes, not to follow the course of action with the most reasons in its favor would be an error of judgment manifesting the lowest degree of worthiness of freedom. The sufficient reason for holding back is not acceptance of the PAP, but the sake of the supreme good: freedom.Despite Ragland's gallant efforts to enlist Descartes in support of PAP, and his insistence that “Descartes consistently embraced PAP in some form” (84), that's not Descartes's conception of the essence of freedom. This, however, can be seen as part of the value of Ragland's book, in that it focuses one's mind on considering and understanding Descartes's distinctive conception of freedom.Thus in spite of my reservations, I recommend The Will to Reason. It's an exemplar of a well-researched and meticulously documented piece of scholarship on very difficult terrain, which stimulates and provokes, and deserves serious attention.Thanks to Andrew Chignell, Anil Gomes, Dai Heide, and Andrew Stephenson for discussion of various matters related to this review

Antinomy · Compatibilism · Economic Justice · Epistemology · Free will · Metaphysics · Political science · Theodicy · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Religious Studies and Spiritual Practices · Theology and Philosophy of Evil

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