A dualist theory of experience

Bibliographic Data

ID10702248
AuthorsBradford Saad (0000-0003-2492-6214, University of Oxford, corresponding author)
Year2025
Volume182
Issue3-4
Pages939-967
Publication date2025-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophical Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8116 • E-ISSN: 1573-0883
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s11098-025-02290-3
PMID40351708
OpenAlexW4407682080
LanguageEN
References cited58

Dualism holds that experiences somehow arise from physical states, despite being neither identical with nor grounded in such states. This paper motivates a stringent set of constraints on constructing a dualist theory of experience. To meet the constraints, a dualist theory must: (1) construe experiences as causes of physical effects, (2) ensure that experiences do not cause observable violations of the causal closure of the physical domain, (3) avoid overdetermination, (4) specify a set of psychophysical laws that yield experiences as a function of physical states, and (5) ensure that functional duplication preserves phenomenology. After motivating these constraints and explaining why existing dualist theories satisfy only some of them, I construct a dualist theory that satisfies all of them. On the resulting theory—which I call delegatory dualism —experiences uphold causal responsibilities “delegated” to them by physical states

Dualism · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Overdetermination · Phenomenology (philosophy) · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of mind · Set (abstract data type) · Computer Science · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Quantum Mechanics and Applications

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