Can Behaviors Be Adaptations

Bibliographic Data

ID10702596
AuthorsCatherine Driscoll (0000-0002-9842-0534, corresponding author)
Year2004
Volume71
Issue1
Pages16-35
Publication date2004-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1086/381410
OpenAlexW2005080753
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited3

Kim Sterelny and Paul Griffiths (Sterelny 1992, Sterelny and Griffiths 1999) have argued that sociobiology is unworkable because it requires that human behaviors can be adaptations; however, behaviors produced by a functionalist psychology do not meet Lewontin's quasi-independence criterion and therefore cannot be adaptations. Consequently, an evolutionary psychology—which regards psychological mechanisms as adaptations—should replace sociobiology. I address two interpretations of their argument. I argue that the strong interpretation fails because functionalist psychology need not prevent behaviors from evolving independently, and it relies on too strong an interpretation of the quasi-independence criterion. The weaker interpretation does not undermine sociobiology, and evolutionary psychology would be vulnerable to the same criticism. Finally, I offer reasons to think that both mental mechanisms and behaviors can be adaptations

Adaptation (eye) · Argument (complex analysis) · Consilience · Epistemology · Evolutionary psychology · Inclusive fitness · Independence (probability theory) · Interpretation (philosophy) · Sociobiology · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology · Social Psychology

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