The Asymmetry of Counterfactual Dependence

Bibliographic Data

ID10703017
AuthorsChristian Loew (0000-0003-4051-2476, University of Luxembourg, corresponding author)
Year2017
Volume84
Issue3
Pages436-455
Publication date2017-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1086/692142
OpenAlexW2622649321
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited14

A certain type of counterfactual is thought to be intimately related to causation, control, and explanation. The time asymmetry of these phenomena therefore plausibly arises from a time asymmetry of counterfactual dependence. But why is counterfactual dependence time asymmetric? The most influential account of the time asymmetry of counterfactual dependence is David Albert’s account, which posits a new, time-asymmetric fundamental physical law, the so-called past hypothesis. Albert argues that the time asymmetry of counterfactual dependence arises from holding fixed the past hypothesis when evaluating counterfactuals. In this article, I argue that Albert’s account misconstrues the time asymmetry of counterfactual dependence

Asymmetry · Causation · Counterfactual conditional · Counterfactual thinking · Econometrics · Economics · Epistemology · Physics · Positive economics · Quantum mechanics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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