When Causal Specificity Does Not Matter (Much)
Insights from HIV Treatment
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10703113 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jacob P Neal (0000-0003-3705-8858, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 86 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 836-846 |
| Publication date | 2019-12-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1086/705510 |
| OpenAlex | W2964302760 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 7 |
Philosophers of biology generally agree that causal specificity tracks biological importance: more specific causes are more important. I argue that this correlation does not hold in much research aimed at biomedical intervention. Applying James Woodward’s analysis of causal specificity to the development and design of HIV treatments, I show that drugs that are less causally specific produce better therapeutic outcomes and are more highly valued. Thus, I conclude that the importance of biological causes does not track their specificity but instead varies depending on the biological practice we consider and the goals of that practice
Epistemology · Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) · Intervention (counseling) · Psychiatry · Immunology · Medicine · Pharmacogenetics and Drug Metabolism · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology · Race, Genetics, and Society
| Highly cited | No |
|---|