The Trouble with Homunculus Theories
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10703196 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Joseph Margolis (Temple College, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1980 |
| Volume | 47 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 244-259 |
| Publication date | 1980-06-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1086/288931 |
| OpenAlex | W1980610159 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 17 |
The so-called post-Wittgensteinian Oxford philosophers are often criticized not only for failing to provide for the causal explanation of human behavior and psychological states, but also for failing to recognize that psychological explanations require appeal to sub-personal or molecular processes. Three strategies accommodating this criticism appear in so-called homunculus theories and include: (1) that the sub-systems be assigned intentional or informational content purely heuristically; (2) that the intentional or informational content of molar states be analyzed without remainder in terms of molecular processing; (3) that the entire or salient range of mental or informational molar states be accessible at the molecular level, or vice versa. Option (2) proves to be the most radical and is favored by Dennett. (1) relevantly requires a reduction of the intentional. (3) is illustrated in various ways by the views of Freud, Chomsky, Fodor. (2) is shown to depend on (1) or to be idle; and (3) embraces at least in part an appeal to molar-level explanation. The argument developed attempts to show the sense in which discourse about molar and molecular-level phenomena in the psychological context is fundamentally different from macroscopic and microtheoretical-level discourse about physical phenomena. The conclusion drawn is that neither a molar nor a sub-personal level theory is suitably explanatory in the psychological sense: a psychological theory is committed rather to a set of sub-personal components of such systems, that serve to explain molar phenomena
Appeal · Argument (complex analysis) · Content (measure theory) · Context (archaeology) · Eliminative materialism · Epistemology · Set (abstract data type) · Behavioral and Psychological Studies · Chemistry · Child and Animal Learning Development · Computer Science · History · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
Science and Human Behavior
The interpretation of dreams.
Verbal behavior.
Political Philosophy and the Idea of a Social Science
Materialism and the mind—body problem
Syntactic Structures
The stubborn opacity of belief contexts
Persons and Minds
Mental Terms, Theoretical Terms, and Materialism
The Explanation of Behavior
Studies in Philosophical Psychology
Action, Emotion and Will
Actions, Reasons, and Causes
Content and consciousness
Intentionality and Intensionality
Verbal behavior
| Citations per year | 0.29 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2019 - 2026 (8) |
| Highly cited | No |