William James on Time Perception
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10703502 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Gerald E Myers (City University of New York, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1971 |
| Volume | 38 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 353-360 |
| Publication date | 1971-09-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1086/288376 |
| OpenAlex | W2028641146 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 5 |
James argued that time is a sensation, and the main point of this paper is to deny that claim. The concept of the specious present is explained, indicating how it clarifies the concept of “the present moment.” But neither it nor an argument used by Mach and James show time to be a sensation. The analysis presented here requires distinguishing concepts of sensation from concepts of temporal relations. James' view is really a theory that time-as-duration is sensed. But this assumes that the description of time as sensed is also a description of time as an objective property of independent events. This is nowhere established, and making it plausible is a recurrent problem for philosophies like neutral monism and radical empiricism
Argument (complex analysis) · Art · Cognitive psychology · Duration (music) · Empiricism · Epistemology · Literature · Monism · Perception · Property (philosophy) · Sensation · Time perception · Philosophy · Philosophy, Science, and History · Psychology
| Citations per year | 0.33 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2023 - 2023 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |