Probabilities as Truth-Value Estimates
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10703578 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Hugues Leblanc (Bryn Mawr College, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1961 |
| Volume | 28 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 414-417 |
| Publication date | 1961-10-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1086/287827 |
| OpenAlex | W2045645303 |
| Language | EN |
The author recently claimed that Pr(P, Q), where Pr is a probability function and P and Q are two sentences of a formalized language L , qualifies as an estimate—made in the light of Q —of the truth-value of P in L. To substantiate his claim, the author establishes here that the two strategies lying at the opposite extremes of the spectrum of truth-value estimating strategies meet the first five of the six requirements (R1-R6) currently placed upon probability functions and fail to meet the sixth one. He concludes from those two results that the value for P and Q of any function satisfying R1-R5 must rate “minimally satisfactory” and the value for P and Q of any function satisfying R1-R6 must rate “satisfactory” as an estimate—made in the light of Q —of the truth-value of P in L
Epistemology · Function (biology) · Linguistics · Mathematical economics · Statistics · Truth value · Value (mathematics) · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Mathematics · Natural Language Processing Techniques · Philosophy · Semantic Web and Ontologies
| Highly cited | No |
|---|