The Philosophical Requirements for an Adequate Conception of Scientific Rationality

Bibliographic Data

ID10703585
AuthorsGerald Doppelt (University of California San Diego, corresponding author)
Year1988
Volume55
Issue1
Pages104-133
Publication date1988-03-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1086/289419
OpenAlexW1973912857
LanguageEN
Citations received14
References cited6

I argue that post-Kuhnian approaches to rational scientific change fail to appreciate several distinct philosophical requirements and relativist challenges that have been assumed to be, and may in fact be essential to any adequate conception of scientific rationality. These separate requirements and relativist challenges are clearly distinguished and motivated. My argument then focuses on Shapere's view that there are typically good reasons for scientific change. I argue: (1) that contrary to his central aim, his account of good reasons ultimately presupposes the requirement of universal standards of scientific reasoning; (2) that the good reasons established by his account underdetermine the rationality of scientific change and allow that other changes would have been equally or even more rational; (3) that as a result, Shapere's approach fails to meet what I characterize as the challenges of moderate, sociological, and cognitive relativism

Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Philosophy of science · Rationality · Relativism · Sociology · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy, Science, and History · Science and Climate Studies

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