Acceptance, Values, and Inductive Risk
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10703606 |
|---|---|
| Authors | David Steel (0000-0003-4448-3748, corresponding author), Daniel Steel (0000-0002-9367-7568) |
| Year | 2013 |
| Volume | 80 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 818-828 |
| Publication date | 2013-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1086/673936 |
| OpenAlex | W2176212904 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 14 |
| References cited | 23 |
The argument from inductive risk attempts to show that practical and ethical costs of errors should influence standards of evidence for accepting scientific claims. A common objection charges that this argument presupposes a behavioral theory of acceptance that is inappropriate for science. I respond by showing that the argument from inductive risk is supported by a nonbehavioral theory of acceptance developed by Cohen, which defines acceptance in terms of premising. Moreover, I argue that theories designed to explain how acceptance can be guided exclusively by epistemic values suffer from difficulties that do not afflict Cohen’s theory
Argument (complex analysis) · Economics · Epistemology · Inductive reasoning · Philosophy of science · Positive economics · Scientific theory · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Medicine · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Understanding, Explanation, and Scientific Knowledge
Value encroachment on scientific understanding and discovery
Philosophy and the Precautionary Principle
Inductive Risk, Understanding, and Opaque Machine Learning Models
Delimiting the Proper Scope of Epistemology
Scientific deceit
No free theory choice from machine learning
Theory choice, non-epistemic values, and machine learning
Values, standpoints, and scientific/intellectual movements
John Dewey's pragmatist alternative to the belief-acceptance dichotomy
Science, truth and dictatorship
Values in Science
Assertion, Nonepistemic Values, and Scientific Practice
A (Consequence-Oriented) critique of the argument from inductive risk
Is a Little Pollution Good for You?
Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal
Betting on Theories
Science, Truth, and Democracy
Faces of Intention
Risk and Rationality
Bayesian decision theory, subjective and objective probabilities, and acceptance of empirical hypotheses
Epistemic Values and the Argument from Inductive Risk
On the Seriousness of Mistakes
The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments
Inductive Risk and Values in Science
A Philosophy of Science for the Twenty-First Century
Valuation and Acceptance of Scientific Hypotheses
A New Program for Philosophy of Science
On the Nature and Norms of Theoretical Commitment
| Unique citing works | 14 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,17 |
| Citation span | 2014 - 2025 (12) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 14 |