Stanford’s Unconceived Alternatives from the Perspective of Epistemic Obligations
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10704137 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Matthew Sample (0000-0001-5290-1458, University of Washington, corresponding author), Matthew S Sample |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 82 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 856-866 |
| Publication date | 2015-12-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1086/683324 |
| OpenAlex | W2282141948 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 7 |
Kyle Stanford’s reformulation of the problem of underdetermination has the potential to highlight the epistemic obligations of scientists. Stanford, however, presents the phenomenon of unconceived alternatives as a problem for realists, despite critics’ insistence that we have contextual explanations for scientists’ failure to conceive of their successors’ theories. I propose that responsibilist epistemology and the concept of “role oughts,” as discussed by Lorraine Code and Richard Feldman, can pacify Stanford’s critics and reveal broader relevance of the “new induction.” The possibility of unconceived alternatives pushes us to question our contemporary expectation for scientists to reason outside of their historical moment
Epistemology · Perspective (graphical) · Phenomenon · Philosophy of science · Political science · Relevance (law) · Sociology · Underdetermination · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |