Reduction, Elimination, and the Mental

Bibliographic Data

ID10704273
AuthorsJustin Schwartz (The Ohio State University, corresponding author)
Year1991
Volume58
Issue2
Pages203-220
Publication date1991-06-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1086/289612
OpenAlexW2080780095
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited11

The antireductionist arguments of many philosophers (e.g., Baker, Fodor and Davidson) are motivated by a worry that successful reduction would eliminate rather than conserve the mental. This worry derives from a misunderstanding of the empiricist account of reduction, which, although it does not underwrite “cognitive suicide”, should be rejected for its positivist baggage. Philosophy of psychology needs more detailed attention to issues in natural science which serve as analogies for reduction of the mental. I consider a range of central cases, including water and H 2 O, genes and DNA, and common sense and scientific solidity. The last case is illuminated by Eddington's Two Tables paradox, a resolution which suggests the plasticity of the mental under reduction. If reduction of the mental is like any of these cases, it is neither empiricist nor eliminative

Empiricism · Epistemology · Philosophy of science · Positivism · Reduction (mathematics) · Worry · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology

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