Responsiveness and Robustness in the David Lewis Signaling Game
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10704331 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Carl Brusse (0000-0001-5732-8750, Australian National University, corresponding author), Justin Bruner (0009-0005-8090-3393, Australian National University) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 84 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 1068-1079 |
| Publication date | 2017-12-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1086/694156 |
| OpenAlex | W2541128298 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 15 |
We consider modifications to the standard David Lewis signaling game and relax a number of unrealistic implicit assumptions that are often built into the framework. In particular, we motivate and explore various asymmetries that exist between the sender and receiver roles. We find that endowing receivers with a more realistic set of responses significantly decreases the likelihood of signaling, while allowing for unequal selection pressure often has the opposite effect. We argue that the results of this article can also help make sense of a well-known evolutionary puzzle regarding the absence of an evolutionary arms race between sender and receiver in conflict-of-interest signaling games
Biology · Cognitive science · Communication source · Economics · Game theory · Mathematical economics · Robustness (evolution) · Set (abstract data type) · Signaling game · Telecommunications · Computer Science · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Psychology
| Citations per year | 0.29 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2019 - 2020 (2) |
| Highly cited | No |