Are There Rival, Incommensurable Theories
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10704607 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Dale W Moberg (Hobart and William Smith Colleges, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1979 |
| Volume | 46 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 244-262 |
| Publication date | 1979-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1086/288864 |
| OpenAlex | W2064924314 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 9 |
Following an account of the incommensurability argument, an objection, based on assumptions concerning rival theories, is examined and rejected. This rejection leads to an alternative direction of criticism of incommensurability, a direction that involves the articulation of comparative standards of theory evaluation that are independent of meaning invariance
Argument (complex analysis) · Articulation (sociology) · Criticism · Epistemology · Meaning (existential) · Political science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History
| Unique citing works | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,13 |
| Citation span | 1980 - 2021 (42) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |