The Empirical Nonequivalence of Genic and Genotypic Models of Selection

A (Decisive) Refutation of Genic Selectionism and Pluralistic Genic Selectionism

Bibliographic Data

ID10705037
AuthorsRobert N Brandon (0009-0003-7168-1237), H Frederik Nijhout (0000-0001-5436-5345, Duke University)
Year2006
Volume73
Issue3
Pages277-297
Publication date2006-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1086/515416
OpenAlexW2045178217
LanguageEN
Citations received7
References cited29

Genic selectionists (Williams 1966; Dawkins 1976) defend the view that genes are the (unique) units of selection and that all evolutionary events can be adequately represented at the genic level. Pluralistic genic selectionists (Sterelny and Kitcher 1988; Waters 1991; Dawkins 1982) defend the weaker view that in many cases there are multiple equally adequate accounts of evolutionary events, but that always among the set of equally adequate representations will be one at the genic level. We describe a range of cases all involving stable equilibria actively maintained by selection. In these cases genotypic models correctly show that selection is active at the equilibrium point. In contrast, the genic models have selection disappearing at equilibrium. For deterministic models this difference makes no difference. However, once drift is added in, the two sets of models diverge in their predicted evolutionary trajectories. Thus, contrary to received wisdom on this matter, the two sets of models are not empirically equivalent. Moreover, the genic models get the facts wrong

Biology · Evolutionary biology · Range (aeronautics) · Selection (genetic algorithm) · Set (abstract data type) · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Evolution and Genetic Dynamics · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Philosophy and History of Science

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